The recent debate on the Eurozone failed to appreciate a particular characteristic of European crisis experiences, namely their fundamentally political character. To make my argument, I borrow from Dani Rodrik (2000) the framework of a "political trilemma" between cross-border economic integration, national institutions and democracy (in the sense of mass politics) and discuss its relation to the more commonly known "macroeconomic trilemma" as well as some limitations of the framework. The recent experience of a European debt crisis and the experience of Europe's Great Depression can be interpreted as a "political trilemma": both reflect the problem of designing effective policy responses to major economic shocks within the environment of deep economic integration across political boundaries and the regime choices that this involves. Within this framework I highlight some aspects of the 1930s that are informative to the policy choices in Europe today. Once we accept that some policy choices should be avoided, attention should be shifted to the remaining options and the obstacles that prevent their implementation, notably the challenge to transform democracy beyond national borders.
I. Introduction
Ever since 2008, when a crisis of the US-housing market spread worldwide, commentators have noted a sense of helplessness of policymakers with regard to the extent, complexity and speed of economic events. Academic economists and policy advisers, who mostly had been taken by surprise by this series of events, started to look for guidance from two sides: first, theory -for example by several recent efforts to model the financial sector explicitly within Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium DSGE frameworks and to improve our understanding of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies -and second, also from history. Unsurprisingly the focus here was put on previous crisis experiences such as the Great Depression (for example Crafts and Fearon, 2010) , or earlier sovereign debt crises that apparently featured some similarities to the contemporary experience. A common point in these accounts is the conclusion that political leaders were slow to react to the challenges posed by economic developments and that once they reacted it was too little too late or altogether misguided, especially so in Europe.
In this brief paper, I want to argue that most of the contributions from both historians and theorists to the recent debate failed to appreciate a particular characteristic of European crisis experiences, namely their fundamentally political character and the challenges this implies to policymakers. 1 To make this argument, I first borrow from Dani Rodrik (2000) the framework of a "political trilemma" between cross-border economic integration, national institutions and democracy (in the sense of mass politics) and discuss its relation to the more commonly known "macroeconomic trilemma" as 1 An assumption, which is implicit to my argument but not explicitly spelled out is that the main difficulties that Europe faces today and in the interwar period are and were "homemade", and not due for example to some fundamental lack of competitiveness with regard to rising international rivals such as the US or Asian economies. To be specific, I assume that Europe at least since the last third of the 19 th century suffered mostly from a mismatch between economic relations at a European (in part even global) level and local or national politics.
2 well as some limitations of the framework. The recent experience of a European debt crisis and the experience of Europe's Great Depression can be interpreted as a "political trilemma" as both reflect the problem of designing effective policy responses to major economic shocks within the environment of deep economic integration across political boundaries and the regime choices that this involves. Within this framework I will highlight some aspects of the 1930s that are informative to the policy choices in Europe today. Finally, if we accept that some possible policy choices should be avoided, we should shift our attention to the remaining options and the obstacles that prevent their implementation. I briefly point to some of them, notably the challenge to transform democracy in a way that it can reach beyond national borders.
II.
The nation-state, mass politics and economic integration: is there a "political trilemma"?
A well-established framework in international economics is known as the "macroeconomic policy trilemma" (for a good textbook exposition see Feenstra and Taylor (2008) , chap. 15). It describes the impossibility to combine three generally desirable policy objectives at the same time: first, fixed exchange rates to promote stability in trade and investment, second, open capital markets to promote efficiency in capital allocation and risk sharing and third, monetary policy autonomy to manage the domestic business cycle and limit the pressure for internal adjustment to external imbalances. Under the assumption that it takes time before prices and wages adjust, it can be shown that policymakers have to give up one of the three objectives. Provided countries have more than one trading partner, they can also form a regional block such that the need to adjust to external imbalances is minimal, as suggested by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961 ).
Europe's historical experience strongly suggests that these constraints were usually binding. It has been argued that under the classical Gold Standard policy makers de facto chose to sacrifice monetary policy autonomy (Obstfeld et al 2005) , a policy which became increasingly untenable during the interwar period as we will discuss below. The formation of the Eurozone has often been interpreted as reflecting again the logic of the trilemma. With the decision to fix exchange rates from 1999 onwards within a common monetary regime and ever deepening economic integration, economic policy at a national scale lost its autonomy. The discussion about the tenability of this decision was largely conducted within this logic, starting with Eichengreen's question "Is Europe an
Optimum Currency Area?" (Eichengreen 1990 However, this logic understates the actual constraints on economic policy that are implied by deep economic integration. To see this it is helpful to consider what Dani Rodrik (2000) called the "augmented trilemma", given by impossibility to combine economic integration, with national institutions and democracy in the sense of mass politics. Let us briefly define these three. National institutions would be defined by the political boundaries of a state, where we use state and nation interchangeably. Deep economic integration would encompass the reduction in barriers to commodity and factor markets, including the technology to diffuse information across political boundaries. Finally, democracy as mass politics is here understood as a political regime that is participatory with unrestricted franchise, responsive and transparent, so that it at least broadly reflects the main streams of politically mobilized groups (whatever their objectives -for example with regards to human rights). Rodrik (2000) argued that we can have at most two of these three.
"If we want true international economic integration, we have to go either with the nationstate, in which case the domain of national politics will have to be significantly restricted, or else with mass politics, in which case we will have to give up the nation-state in favor of global federalism. If we want highly participatory political regimes, we have to choose between the nation-state and international economic integration. If we want to keep the nation-state, we have to choose between mass politics and international economic integration." (Rodrik 2000, p. 180) .
Several things are notable here. To start with, Rodrik thinks about constraints in the long-run. In the short-to medium run (the perspective which often predominates in politics due to term limits and election cycles) policymakers might go a long way with solutions in-between before they will have to face some tough choices. In particular, the immediate reaction to a crisis might be some attempt by sovereign national governments to coordinate their policy rather than the emergence of transnational federal institutions. However, to be effective such a reaction would have to be quick, bold and credible. Given that coordination within and between sovereign democracies needs time and is always threatened by veto-players, this either tends to be ineffective or it will be insulated from political participation. Second, in the same way as international economic integration does not really encompass all parts of the world equally so that the logic of the macroeconomic trilemma should better be applied to the internal logic of regional blocks of integration such as Europe or
North America than to the world as a whole, this "augmented trilemma" needs not to hold on a global scale but it does help understanding the choices of policy makers within Europe. prior to the (re-) formation of the Gold-Exchange rate as well as in the early 1990s prior to the formation of the EMU was that fixed exchange rates are threatened by speculative attacks unless governments, resp. their central banks signal their determination to not only adjust monetary policy but also fiscal policy to defend the external value of the currency. Membership in the Gold Standard as well as membership in the Euro was seen as a signal to international business and investors to voluntarily limit the scope for expansionary policies, be they monetary or fiscal in nature (on the interwar experience see Bordo et al. 1999 , on the political economy of the EMU see for example
Rotte and Zimmermann 1998). In spite of some early warnings, however, the far-reaching political implications of this self-selection into the Gold-Standard in the mid-1920s or the EMU in the early 1990s did not become apparent until a major shock hit the European economies: both in the 1930s
and today the choice is not one between fixed exchange rates and stabilization policies given economic integration but rather about the reach of political institutions (within or beyond existing national boundaries) and their responsiveness to politically mobilized groups.
After the First World War, policymakers struggled to combine their (sometimes new) national institutions with the idea of (a sometimes young) democracy and exposure to foreign economic forces. When a major shock hit in 1929, it seemed inconceivable to sacrifice the nation states and move towards the idea of a federation of states (as suggested by some). Policymakers attempted to 5 find some coordinated policy response between sovereign states but were painfully slow to progress. consequences of the war with implications for the coordination of economic policies were the change in character and the fragility of the new political institutions, the unsettled issues of war debts and reparations, and finally the 1920s inflation which was a consequence of the war debts, which restricted the options of economic policy. Let me briefly discuss each of them.
Everywhere in Europe, the postwar situation made it necessary for societies to struggle over the distribution of income and war-debts. The fundamental issue was "whether deflation and unemployment would saddle a major share of the load on the working class, as contrasted with the rentier" (Kindleberger 1986, p. 323) . But the political bargaining power of labor had dramatically increased as a result of political compromises reached during and immediately after the war.
Examples include the significant extension of the franchise or the introduction of the eight hour day in many countries. Not at least, the political threat posed by the Soviet Union raised the political bargaining power of the moderate left. This made it harder to sacrifice autonomous monetary policy geared towards external stabilization. When devaluation in response to an outflow of gold and foreign exchange was no longer a viable option, and unilateral expansion was considered risky unless accompanied by a strict regime of exchange controls, international cooperation became more important than ever before (Eichengreen 1992, p. 10) . In addition, the new institutional framework made it more difficult to cooperate. The political landscape that had emerged after 1918 was significantly more democratic than prior to the war, but also less stable. There were a number of new states including Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, and other successors of the Habsburg Empire, but also the Republic of Irleand whose borders, sovereignty and included national minorities continued to be the subject of international disputes throughout the interwar years (Wandycz 1988) .
Also, this political instability was by no means limited to the new democracies. Governments in nearly all European countries were less stable after the war than before. Table 1 shows the average duration of Cabinets for a broad selection of countries.
[ Table 1 about here]
Not only had the losers of the war, such as Germany or Austria and Hungary experienced a significant increase in political tribalism and government instability after the war, but equally members of the winning coalition, notably France and Britain. This instability, accompanied in countries like Germany with an increase in the fragmentation of the acting coalition governments, impeded and delayed political decisions within countries and the coordination of policies across countries (Simmons 1994) .
A second factor that impeded international cooperation stemmed from the web of debts between the Allies and massive claims for reparations against the Central Powers, which the war had produced. This and the rivalry with commercial loans impeded the recreation of international finance in the 1920s (Kindleberger 1986, p 298) . Germany in particular was opposed to reparation claims, but eager to attract commercial loans. In contrast, France wanted to get rid of war debts, had only limited interest in commercial lending, but considered reparations from Germany as necessary both to rebuild the devastated provinces in the north and east, and to repay war debts to Britain and most importantly to the United States. Britain in turn was from about 1920 onwards prepared to cancel out reparations and war debt but was interested in commercial lending. Instead, the United States had little interest in reparations. Congress wanted to collect the war debts and American financiers wanted to revitalise commercial lending (Schuker 1988) . Given the extent of the various claims, they significantly distorted the incentives for policymakers in domestic and international decisions. In May 1921 the Reparations Commission announced the London Schedule of Payments that amounted to a reparations bill of 132 billion gold marks, denominated in gold and payable in gold, commodities or services. Critically, this bill came in two parts. Germany would have to pay interest and amortisation on two ("A" and "B") bond series over about 50 billion gold marks that were meant to cover the Allied war costs and debts, while the remaining "C" bonds would be issued later depending on Germany's capacity to pay (Schuker 1988) . The former sum was comparable to pre-war experience, notably to the French indemnity of 1871, the 50 th anniversary of which happened to coincide with the announcement of the London Schedule and roughly in line with Keynes' estimation of a payable maximum (Ritschl 2002, pp. 223ff.) . While payment on the second part of the bill was deferred until
Germany would have become sufficiently prosperous, it had far-reaching political implications.
Internationally, the C-bonds served as a strategic asset in inter-allied negotiations on war-debts.
Within Germany they undermined the efforts of the so-called "Weimar coalition" (the socialdemocrat SPD, the liberal DDP and the conservative catholic Zentrum) to stabilise the young 8 democracy, because the extent of this claim was considered as excessive even by moderate political forces. What is possibly more important, the link of the "C" bonds to the condition of the German economy "diminished the incentive for German policymakers to put their house in order" (Eichengreen 1992, p. 128) . difficulties. This arrangement essentially introduced a "transfer protection" that safeguarded the service of commercial over reparation debts (Schuker 1988, p. 35) A third consequence of the war was inflation, which in several cases turned into hyperinflation. It is not so much the inflation itself, but the memory of inflation among policymakers, savers and 9 consumers that mattered for international economic policy in the 1930s. The experience of inflation during the 1920s would prove to be one of the best predictors of which countries would allow their currencies to depreciate in the 1930s. Technically, prices rose everywhere in Europe after the war because output was weak, while several factors contributed to an increase in money supply. It is disputed to what extent the increase in money supply was an endogenous response to changes in demand or the result of explicit economic policies, and the answer to this will vary across countries.
Let us briefly consider the cases of France and Germany. Table 2 gives the development of consumer prices 1920-1926 in France and Germany.
[ Table 2 about here]
Clearly, inflation in France never reached the extent of that in Germany (or Poland), but it was high enough to undermine public trust in the country's monetary authorities. After the war, the French expected German reparations to reconstruct the country to the extent that reconstruction expenditures in the extraordinary budget were balanced by reparation receipts that had not yet been collected (Kindleberger 1986 ). When German deliveries fell into arrears over the summer of 1922, The German hyperinflation 1921-1924 was one of the most extreme cases recorded in history. The debate on it has often been described in terms of a competition between a balance-of payments school and a fiscal view, but fundamentally the origins of inflation in Germany were similar to anywhere else: there was no consensus regarding the distribution of income and tax burdens. While some progress towards such a consensus was made during 1920, this was undermined by the reparations problem. The political situation after 1919 was fragile but the "Weimar Coalition" had implemented far-reaching tax reforms in 1919 and 1920 and organised significant "interim payments" in anticipation of a formal agreement on reparations, that amounted to some 20 percent 10 of German national income in 1921 (Eichengreen 1992, p. 129 the lag between tax assessment and tax collection, inflation eroded government revues. The government started to print money on an unprecedented scale to cover expenses, and from January 1923 onwards to fund the striking miners. While it is undisputable that the mounting budget deficits led to money creation, inflation and depreciation, the fundamental cause of the budget deficit is still debated. German politicians maintained the balance-of-payments view that capital flight weakened the exchange rate, which drove up import prices and triggered domestic inflation, higher money demand and hence an increase in money supply (Bresciani-Turroni 1937, p. 45) . While it can be shown that the budget would still have been in deficit in the absence of inflation, the extent of this deficit can be largely explained by reparations payments (Webb 1989, p. 37 European countries. But the new political and economic stability soon proved to be frail. Germany was at the brink of a recession already in 1927, as indicated by a fall in industrial investment (Temin 1971, p. 247 ) and orders to German machinery industry (Ritschl 2003a, p. 116 that turned a bad recession into the great depression (Temin 1989, p. 38) . But worse, the crisis undermined the prevailing system of sovereign and democratic nation states. National governments attempted to find some coordinated policy response between sovereign states, but they were painfully slow to progress. Especially after spring 1931 the choice was between keeping commodity
and capital markets open in spite of rising unemployment and growing political pressure (as in Germany before 1933, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Italy and to some extent France and the Gold-bloc) or rather to partially retreat from economic integration to respond to these pressures (as in the UK and the Commonwealth, Scandinavia, the US and notably Germany after 1933). By 1933 the European economy had been fragmented into several economic blocs. 5 To some extent, membership in the various economic blocs (the "gold bloc", "exchange control bloc" and even the "sterling bloc" that emerged around Britain) was as much a signal of strategic political orientation as of actual economic policy, which can help to explain why these blocs had little effect on trade (Ritschl and Wolf 2010) .
While national borders mattered, European commodity and capital markets in 1929 were still deeply economically integrated, both internally and with the US as a trading partner and major creditor. One indicator of this is the simultaneous movement of manufacturing output and wholesale prices across Europe and the US between 1928 and 1931 (see figures 1 and 2).
[ Figure 1 and 2 about here]
In this situation of deep economic integration, all European governments initially reacted to the shock with restrictive fiscal policies and continued adherence to a common monetary framework (the gold-exchange standard) against growing public resistance. As argued earlier, war debts and reparations limited the scope of fiscal policy responses, as did the memory of large-scale inflation, 5 A group of countries that followed Britain off gold in September and October 1931 (with several currencies pegged to sterling) started to recover from about mid-1932 onwards. Another group of countries tried to follow France in her policy of strict adherence to the gold-standard without imposing exchange controls and at prevailing parities, including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland (with Danzig), and Switzerland. All of them experienced a continued deflation, and further economic decline (see figures 1 and 2). Finally, there was a group of "exchange control countries", including Germany, Austria, Hungary and several other Central and Eastern European countries that had openly introduced exchange controls to limit further capital losses, but did not devalue. Instead, they introduced a complex web of clearing agreements to manage trade on a bilateral basis at increasingly inappropriate exchange rates (Nurkse 1944, pp.162-189 (Kindleberger 1986, p. 361 risks, but the same applied to potential alternatives. As described earlier, any signal of political "goodwill" during the crisis of 1931 essentially amounted to the announcement of radically deflationary policies. On the eve of a visit to the British prime minister, the cabinet had decided on another bundle of deflationary measures on an unprecedented scale that appeared to be unacceptable to the majority of the German parliament (Schulz 1992, pp. 357) . During Brüning's stay in Britain, on 6 th June 1931 the government published a carefully drafted statement that announced the deflationary measures together with a dramatic appeal that the German people had now reached the limit of its ability to suffer and needed relief from the burden of reparation (Schulz 1992, p. 382) . The ensuing run on the Reichsmark came to a halt when several parties, including the moderate left, decided not to overturn the new budget on 16 June (Winkler 1993, p. 413) and president Hoover proposed a moratorium on war debts and reparations on 20 June to gain time for international negotiations. However, France showed strong resistance against the moratorium until 7
July. In the meantime, news spread about massive losses of Nordwolle, a textile company, which sparked a run on its main creditors, Danatbank and Dresdner Bank (Kindleberger 1986, p. 363) . The remainder was a repetition of the events in Austria, but now in the setting of a "twin crisis" (Schnabel) . International efforts to halt the run on the Reichsmark and support the Reichsbank in her attempt to bail out the banks were too little too late, largely due to disputes about reparations and Germany's ability to continue deflation. Between August and September Germany imposed 6 There was actually one successful major international loan to Germany after the Young loan of June 1930, organised by Lee, Higginson and even with French participation, see Ferguson and Temin (2003) , FN 67. However, the circumstances of this loan were rather particular and included not at least French demands for additional securities and further fiscal tightening in Germany; see James (1985) , pp. 121ff. and Ritschl (2002) There is a vast literature on the German crisis, which I will not even attempt to summarize, but instead present a perspective on recent and ongoing research. Let us start with some data.
Chancellor . In contrast, the German government continued its deflationary policy after the summer 1931, accompanied by political turmoil and heated discussions about the appropriate course of economic policy (see Borchardt 1979 Borchardt , 1990 . In 15/16 September 1931, several leading German economists discussed the available policy options, including Colm, Eucken, and Roepke (Borchardt and Schoetz 1987) . The explicit aim of the meeting, convened by the Reichsbank and the FriedrichList society, was to discuss a stimulation of the economy, which was considered to be necessary to reduce mass unemployment. The discussion focussed on the feasibility of a credit expansion to fund public labour programmes as suggested by Wilhelm Lautenbach, a high-ranking official at the Economics ministry. In summary, the economists warned against any expansionary policy without international consent. Once the international constraints were removed, they recommended implementing expansionary policies without further delay. This paradox double-strategy was apparently also the one followed by Brüning, who prepared in early 1932 several expansionary programmes that were implemented by his successors von Papen and Hitler (Ritschl 2002 , pp. 172-15 176, Buchheim 2008 . But the crucial negotiations on reparations (and related to this wardebts) following the Hoover moratorium of June 1931 were delayed, not at least by elections in
France and the United States, while unemployment and support for the NSDAP rose in Germany.
When reparations were finally cancelled at Lausanne in early July 1932 (still subject to U.S. consent on a reduction of war-debts), Brüning had already been forced to resign and Hitler was within reach of power.
Hence, the question is whether expansionary economic policies to fight unemployment and kick-start the economy could have succeeded prior to the summer of 1932. The perceived risks of unilateral monetary or fiscal expansion ranged from another uncontrollable inflation, renewed pressures by the Allies such as another occupation of the Ruhr, to forced autarky. Holtfrerich (1982 Holtfrerich ( , 1990 Holtfrerich ( , 1996 and Temin (1989) argued that none of the alternative could have been more risky than the policy pursued: "even a certain amount of chaos on the way to recovery might well have been preferable to (…) the rise of Hitler" (Temin 1989, p. 73) . While this is certainly true by hindsight, it can hardly do justice to the historical circumstances. First, the international risks of unilateral steps taken by Germany in 1932 were indeed considerable. The government must have weighted the risks based on the experience of the Ruhr occupation ten years earlier, which was followed by the dramatic collapse of the Mark. Second, expansionary policy would have been the remedy in the narrow logic of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, not in a broader sense of a "political trilemma". Clearly, the deflationary policies made things worse in the short-run. But from the perspective of spring 1932 it was far from obvious that any type of expansionary policy would have produced a significant and quick reduction in unemployment (and German economists and policymakers were rather more optimistic in that respect than most of their European counterparts in Britain and certainly France). (Ciałowicz 1970, p. 162f) . In this political environment of 1931 it is hardly surprising that Poland followed neither Germany (still her largest trading partner) nor later Britain off gold -while Poland suffered the deepest decline of industrial production in the world.
Here, the integration of capital markets was directly related to the defense of national sovereignty. In addition to a possible risk of inflation, the Polish government feared to lose access to French capital when it felt to need it most. Polish monetary policy apparently hinged to a large degree on the strategic considerations of the authoritarian regime. This is supported by a private memorandum of late 1935 by W. M. Zawadzki, an eminent Polish economist, founding member of the Econometric Society, who served as Minister of Finance between 1931 and 1935 (Landau and Tomaszewski 1965 .
In this he recapitulated his monetary policy. Importantly, this memorandum was never meant for publication (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1965) . Zawadzki stressed that his monetary policy was based on two principles: first, to finance the military (!) budget of the Polish state to which the whole economy must be adapted, and related to his second, to stick to the gold exchange standard. He describes his motivation for the latter as threefold: first, to gain access to foreign capital. Second, to avoid domestic turmoil after a destabilization of the currency that could undermine the authority of the regime; Zawadzki was apparently neglecting the fact that the implementation of fiscal austerity measures contributed to a rise in unemployment and could also undermine political stability. And finally third, Zawadzki mentioned the fact that a devaluation of the Złoty would "automatically decrease the military budget", because it would decrease its purchasing power abroad. 10 In addition, he was positively convinced that it was possible to overcome the crisis by a downward adjustment of prices, 11 and pursued this policy until his demission in October 1935. Polish economic historians agree that this policy of deflation was largely responsible for the significant increase in unemployment. Poland suffered through a severe economic crisis, with more deflation and a worse decline in industrial output than in other European countries. From 1932 onwards, a growing number of economists and politicians argued for a change in monetary policy, most notably the Kraków group around Krzyżanowski and Zweig that proposed in June 1932 a cautious devaluation without expansionary monetary policy; probably not a solution to the problem (see Knakiewicz 1967, p. 96) .
Members of the Central Bank's board were split over the question of devaluation in mid 1932, but
Zawadzki as minister of finance had the final say (Karpiński 1958, p. 113) . What is more, the number of industrial strikes, factories affected and hours lost during strikes, started to increase slowly in 1932 (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, p. 284) . The authoritarian government certainly had tools to oppress this opposition not available to democratic governments, but it was also helped by several other factors. The very high share of agriculture in the Polish economy implied that the suffering of a large part of the population during the depression years was limited, as they were unaffected by unemployment and not threatened by starvation. As stated in the Economist "Polish peasants have been accustomed for centuries to hard work and privation. (…) They have plenty to eat and enough to wear, and to the great bulk of the population such problems as bank deposits, currency stability, 18 etc., are not matters of consequence." 12 Given the extreme decline in industrial output, the by European standards still comparatively low rate of unemployment is explained by the low share of industry in the country. Another factor that actually helped the Polish regime to stay on gold and tamed the political opposition was the suspension of the gold exchange standard in the US in 1933.
Since the Great War, the dollar had been a de facto second currency, especially in the southern parts of Poland (due to the tight migration relations of Galicia to the US), used for hoarding but also for common bank transactions. After the dollar devaluation, many people exchanged their dollar holdings into złoty in fear of further losses, and the government perceived this as a gain in the currencies reputation. Besides, the depreciation also brought about a relief in Poland's foreign indebtedness, which had already started with the depreciation of the pound sterling, but most foreign debt was in dollar (Zweig 1944, pp. 62-64) . Among the several effects of the death of (Ciałowicz 1970, p. 216f) . Moreover, the changing political climate in France, with an expected success of Blum's Front Populaire questioned the future of the gold bloc altogether (Mouré 2002, p. 209ff.) . On April 9th, 1936 a National Defence introduced a system of a managed float that allowed a significant devaluation of sterling but stood ready to intervene in the markets (Howson 1980) . The Bank of England increased the bank rate to 6.5% accompanied by discussions about the course of future monetary policy. These discussions were "strongly coloured at the beginning by fears of a dangerous inflation" (Sayers 1976, p. 418) .
Even more so, officials at the Treasury continued the tight fiscal policy stance they had followed during the depression. Fiscal policy did not become expansionary before the extension of Britain's rearmament programme in 1937/ 38 (Middleton 1981 , Thomas 1983 . What caused the recovery visible in price and output data then was the combined effect of devaluation in 1931 and a monetary expansion that started in early 1932. According to Broadberry (1986) , the competitive gain of devaluation and growth impulse was particularly large in 1932. Given devaluation elsewhere and a significant reorientation of trade in the wake of a universal rise of trade barriers in terms of tariffs, quotas and exchange controls, the effective exchange rate actually increased from 1933 onwards 20 (Cairncross and Eichengreen 1983 2 , p. 92). But from late February 1932 onwards, the Bank of England started a stepwise reduction of the bank rate. This new policy of "cheap money" was introduced once Britain had constructed safeguards against external pressure in the hope of recovery within the newly created economic bloc. For another part it was done to reduce the cost of government debt service and help to balance the budget, which was considered crucial to regain confidence in the markets (Howson 1975, p. 89) . The consequent recovery was visible but not spectacular, at least in terms of unemployment rates that never consistently fell below 10% (Thomas 1988, p. 99) . The experience in other countries of the "sterling bloc" was similar. In a broader perspective then Britain (and countries dependent on trade with Britain) chose the option of national sovereignty that is compatible with mass politics due to a partial retreat from economic integration.
III.2: The Euro-Crisis
The choices that policymakers in the 1930s had to face were essentially about economic integration, mass politics and democracy. The choices that policymakers face in Europe today are about governance structures, given economic integration: how to effectively regulate supranational markets, and how to design a framework for economic policies that is robust and credible. While different in many respects, the choices today as in the 1930s reflect fundamentally the same political trilemma.
In autumn 2008 a crisis that had started in the US housing market in August 2007 had turned into a global financial crisis. This was a largely exogenous shock to the European economy, where it put first financial institutions and next many companies under pressure. However it exposed the fragility of the Eurozone, which can be largely traced back to the mismatch between deeply integrated capital and goods markets and national policies. In the words of Baldwin and Gros (2010), the crisis highlighted the "home-grown" problems in the Eurozone, notably the uncoordinated fiscal policies that led several European countries enter the crisis period with already high debt ratios (some above the Maastricht criteria agreed in 1992) and had failed to foster competitiveness policies to reduce intra-European current account imbalances. Moreover, the mismatch between a transnational economy and national policies became clear in the area of financial regulation: national banking policies had failed to provide capital cushions that would have been sufficient to absorb difficulties in the periphery (notably Ireland and the southern member states) without putting the banking systems in the core at risk (Baldwin and Gros, 2010, p. 16 ).
Compared to the 1930s, the situation was very different insofar as member states of the EU and the Eurozone had already started to give up sovereignty to European "federal" institutions. The
European Central Bank conducted monetary policy at the "federal" level, which allowed a swift response to the first wave of a liquidity crisis in 2008/9. However, the ECB was not equipped to guarantee financial stability of the Eurozone, because banking supervision at the "federal" level was (and still is) in its infancy. Moreover, two difficulties became apparent. First, monetary policy all over the world had only limited effects, especially the closer interest rates moved to the lower bound of zero. Second, in such a situation it is crucial that a central bank can "credibly commit to inflation" in order to affect market expectations and hence real interest rates. But the more the ECB would pursue expansionary policies, the more it was perceived as a "supranational fiscal agent" (Thomas Mayer) suspected by both policymakers and their electorate in the core of secretly bailing out the periphery. After national governments had acted quickly and boldly to borrow money for the rescue of banks and businesses -not least with the warnings from the interwar period in their mind -this had led to a large increase in government debt. In some cases debt levels that had already been high, started to look unsustainable. At this stage, investors started to realize the choices: to preserve integration of the EMU, the European governments would either have to find a way to coordinate their expansionary fiscal policies at the federal level (in terms of the ECB monetizing at least part of the sovereign debt or in terms of fiscal transfers), or to implement "national" policies of austerity measures that would face the pressure of mass politics. The risk that the first would fail and the second would be too costly at least in some countries led to a spiraling of their government bond yields, reflecting the risk of their exit from the EMU and partial debt default.
The current situation of the EMU reflects the search for a coordinated policy response in the face of mounting public discontent with restrictive fiscal policies on the one hand side and fears of the consequences of a Eurozone break-up on the other. The challenges are considerable. The economic challenge is that a credible policy response, which would have to be designed to weather another major crisis, needs to encompass both the deep pockets of European taxpayers and that of the ECB as lender of last resort. It also has to provide a European framework for financial regulation. But this needs to be implemented in a way that it does not undermine the independence of the ECB, nor fiscal discipline in EMU member states (Pisany-Ferry 2012) . The political challenge is even more demanding: a credible policy response has to imply some further transfer of political sovereignty to the federal European level to avoid time-consuming political negotiations, without compromising political participation. In terms of Rodrik's trilemma, the fundamental question then is, whether European policymakers will be able to transform democracy beyond national borders, or in the words of Paul De Grauwe " how to embed the Eurozone in a political union". However, the prospect of a full political union seems not very realistic in the next future; indeed there are signs of a nationalist backlash in many parts of Europe. According to De Grauwe (2010) a minimalist solution would involve steps towards a closer political union that address two major fault-lines of the Eurozone: first, policies that address the large current account imbalances that lie at the heart of 22 rising debt burdens in the periphery and the massive exposure of the core (especially Germany) to this debt. One might add that there is also a need to develop a common regulatory framework for financial markets, including European bankruptcy procedures that allow the quick dissolution of financial institutions in distress. And second, De Grauwe argues for policies that allow acting quickly and on a sufficient scale in the face of another crisis: essentially an automatic insurance mechanism (De Grauwe 2010, p. 31) that would provide a robust fiscal capacity at the federal level. Here one might add that there is also a need for mechanisms that avoid the moral hazard, which goes with every insurance scheme. The recent agreement on a "fiscal compact", which provides for debtbrakes enforced by the European Commission and the agreement on the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) address De Grauwe's second point. But little is done to address the first.
The reason for this seems to be that policymakers still do not see the need to tackle the political nature of the crisis. The ESM and mandatory debt-brakes all reflect the intergovernmental approach to the European economy. But it is questionable whether these agreements are any more credible than the earlier versions of the Stability and Growth Pact. What is needed is a political legitimization of European federal policies that in effect has to transfer some political sovereignty from the national to the federal level. Otherwise, political pressures arising at the national level will always threaten these intergovernmental agreements. For example, it is essential that debt-brakes are introduced into the national constitutions. But if national constitutions can be changed now, they can be changed again in the future. To create a union that is both economically and politically sustainable, Europe needs effective policies that would address the large current account imbalances within the Eurozonethat are at the heart of the current sovereign debt crisis.. Such policies would have to address differences in labor market regulations, education policies, and bureaucratic procedures. As an example, the structural deficits that we observe in countries like Greece or Portugal are not only a result of a lack of competitiveness in particular economic sectors but stem to a considerable extent from specialization sectors that compete with the emerging economies of China or India. To change this pattern of specialization, it is clearly insufficient to reduce inefficiencies in the administration of these countries. Instead, Europe needs to invest heavily not only in the infrastructure but also in the education of its southern periphery. It is hard to see how this could be implemented without some very powerful federal institution. This in turn would require a clear and far-reaching political mandate. All this does not seem to be very realistic in the foreseeable future, but it seems to be the most promising way ahead. While still in their infancy, there are signs for the emergence of a European public sphere, with a strengthening European Parliament and a considerable intensification of political coordination among national political movements of related background. Europe will have to transform democracy beyond the national borders or it will not stabilize.
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IV. Conclusion
Several observers have highlighted the parallels between the state of the Eurozone today and the US Confederation at the end of the 18 th century and the beginning of the 19 th (Bordo et al. 2011 , Sargent 2011 , Henning and Kessler 2012 . While the timing of events and many circumstances differed widely, the fundamental choices of policymakers are related: how should the political governance evolve in the presence of increasing economic integration? In the US it took until 1935 before a full political and economic union was reached, and history will not repeat itself in Europe.
However, sovereign nation states in Europe today clearly face pressures to adjust to economic shocks that undermine their political legitimization. Their responses look increasingly like that of technocrats reacting to anonymous market forces that ignore the public voice. In this respect, there are parallels to the situation in the 1930s, where policymakers continued deflationary policies to avoid further economic turbulence. They neglected the political risk of these policies to their peril. While not entirely impossible, it is increasingly difficult and costly to contain the integration of markets for goods, capital and even of labor. However, the deeply integrated markets of today can only be effectively regulated and "tamed" at a level beyond the single nation state. Therefore, the main challenge to European policymakers seems to be how to transform a federation of sovereign national economies into a sovereign economic federation of Europe. With Jean Monnet: Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises. , 1928-1936 (1928=100) Figure 2: the "macroeconomic policy trilemma" , 1928-1936 (1928=100) Source: Wolf (2008) 
